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 PPACA’s cost-containment provisions are modest,  
but could help slow rising costs while sparking  
improvements in quality. 
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Health reform has several broad 
objectives, including expanding 
insurance coverage, containing the 
growth in health care spending, and 
improving quality of care. The 
provisions of the law related to 
coverage expansions are generally 
well-understood and likely to achieve 
their objectives. Policymakers used 
reduced payments to Medicare 
Advantage plans and many types of 
Medicare providers to finance about 
half the costs of coverage expansion. 
The types of limits put on Medicare 
payments have been used successfully 
in the past and, in addition to 
offsetting the costs of coverage, will 
extend the solvency of Medicare. 
Other provisions of the health reform 
law related to cost containment and 
quality improvement are less well-
tested and, as a result, have greater 
uncertainty about their likely effects.  
The lack of a clear consensus on how 
to contain costs led health reformers 
to include several provisions in the 
Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act to reduce costs.
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 These 
include: 
 Health insurance exchanges that 
could promote competition among 
plans based on price and quality; 
 An excise tax on high-cost health 
plans; 
 Delivery system and payment 
reforms; 
 
 The Independent Payment 
Advisory Board focused on 
slowing Medicare and private 
spending growth; 
 Greater emphasis on prevention 
and wellness programs; and 
 Broader efforts to reduce waste, 
fraud, and abuse. 
The uncertainty about the cost-
containing effects of some provisions 
was reflected in Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) cost estimates. The 
CBO seems to have been conservative 
in assigning impacts to many ideas 
that have been highly touted, and it 
focused solely on the budgetary 
effects as opposed to overall health 
care spending.
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The Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) actuaries 
performed the only available analysis 
of the overall impact of health reform 
on national health spending.
3
 It 
showed that health expenditures as a 
share of the gross domestic product 
(GDP) would increase from 17.8 
percent in 2010 to 21.0 percent in 
2019. Without reform, health 
expenditures as a share of GDP were 
projected to be 20.8 percent in 2019. 
This implies that, taking into account 
reduced expenditures on Medicare, 34 
million people would leave the ranks 
of the uninsured in 2019 at a net 
increase in spending of $45.8 
billion—less than a tenth of total 
projected health expenditures in 2019 
under current law. This increase in 
spending may seem small relative to 
the increase in coverage. However, 
the provisions of the law aimed at 
cost-containment—especially in 
private health insurance—seem 
considerably weaker than those 
related to expanding coverage. 
Health Insurance 
Exchanges 
These entities will focus on providing 
individuals and small employers with 
a place to purchase health insurance. 
Exchanges have the potential to 
produce savings by lowering the costs 
of administering a health plan, 
particularly costs related to marketing 
and sales relative to the pre-reform 
environment, and by creating an 
environment in which plans can only 
compete for enrollees by offering low-
cost, high-quality products. The 
exchanges, if functioning correctly, 
would eliminate the ability of health 
plans to select favorable risks through 
medical underwriting or varying 
benefit design. Instead, health plans 
would need to negotiate lower prices 
  
Timely Analysis of Immediate Health Policy Issues  2 
from providers, develop and 
implement approaches that could 
eliminate unnecessary utilization, and 
reduce their administrative costs. 
People purchasing coverage and 
receiving subsidies through the 
exchange have an incentive to select 
lower cost plans to avoid extra 
payments that would be required to 
enroll in more generous plans. 
 
Excise Tax on High-Cost 
Health Plans 
One provision aimed at encouraging 
health plans to gradually provide less 
comprehensive benefits is a 40 
percent excise tax on health plans 
with individual premiums above 
$10,200 and family premiums above 
$27,500. The basic mechanism 
through which this tax will lead to 
cost containment is that it provides 
employers an incentive to reduce the 
generosity of benefits so that premium 
growth is controlled. This means that 
people will likely face higher 
deductibles and copayments, use 
fewer services, and potentially 
become more willing to join plans that 
limit provider choice (e.g., integrated 
delivery systems). Once premium 
growth is reduced, excise tax revenues 
would fall. However, economists and 
cost simulators assume that wages 
would grow more quickly as premium 
growth is slowed. This would result in 
an increase in payroll and income 
taxes that would offset the reduction 
in excise taxes. This tax will not go 
into effect until 2018 (the premium 
thresholds are projected to 2018). As a 
result, the effect of the excise tax 
during the first 10 years of health 
reform will be limited, both in terms 
of revenues it is projected to generate 
and cost containment. However, given 
that the thresholds that determine if a 
plan is subject to the tax are indexed 
to the general rate of inflation after 
2019, CBO predicts that this excise 
tax is likely to have its biggest cost 
containment and revenue effects in the 
second decade of reform.
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Independent Payment 
Advisory Board (IPAB) 
The IPAB will begin making 
recommendations in 2014. In any year 
in which the Medicare per capita 
growth rate exceeded the average of 
growth in the consumer price index 
(CPI) and the Medical Care CPI, the 
IPAB would be required to 
recommend Medicare spending 
reductions. Establishing price changes 
as a target for spending growth is an 
aggressive approach because it does 
not allow for spending growth that 
can result from changes in the volume 
or intensity of services. The IPAB 
recommendations would become law 
unless Congress passed an alternative 
proposal that achieved the same 
budgetary savings. This body could 
have considerable power over some 
Medicare payment rates. However, at 
least initially, the IPAB‟s influence 
over Medicare payments may be 
limited because some provider groups 
are exempted—importantly hospitals 
until 2020. However, between 2015 
and 2019 (the initial period during 
which IPAB‟s influence could be 
felt), the CBO estimates that this 
provision will still save Medicare 
$15.5 billion relative to the current 
baseline. 
 
The CBO goes on to conclude that 
IPAB‟s actions would increase 
payment rates for many providers 
below the rate of inflation. The CBO 
assumes that the IPAB would be 
“fairly effective in reducing costs 
beyond the reductions that would be 
achieved by other aspects of the 
legislation.” The importance of IPAB 
is that it would be required to make 
recommendations that would control 
Medicare spending growth and that 
these recommendations could only be 
replaced by other policy options that 
would achieve comparable spending 
control. Congress would not have the 
ability to ignore the IPAB 
recommendations in the interest of 
protecting provider payments. Barring 
other legislative actions, IPAB could 
be one of the most important cost-
containment provisions in the law and 
have a direct impact on government 
spending and deficits. 
In addition to making policy changes 
that affect Medicare payments, the 
IPAB would also be required to make 
recommendations that could affect 
private health spending. Although 
these recommendations would not be 
binding, they could chart a credible 
path toward lower spending growth. 
Private payers (insurers and 
individuals) would have to work with 
providers and their representatives to 
implement these recommendations, in 
all or in part, but having this roadmap 
to follow could be a major 
improvement over the current state of 
affairs. The IPAB‟s ability to control 
Medicare spending, while maintaining 
beneficiaries‟ access to providers, 
could be limited if there is not a 
serious effort to control private 
spending at the same time. 
Delivery System and 
Payment Reforms 
This set of policy initiatives contains 
several approaches. If successful, they 
would all move the system away from 
one that rewards providers for more 
health care services toward one that 
reduces waste, slows spending 
growth, and rewards quality care. 
Policies initially focused on and tested 
through the Medicare and Medicaid 
programs could be adopted by other 
payers if they seem promising. 
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 One provision would encourage 
physicians and hospitals to form 
accountable care organizations 
(ACOs), which are intended to 
develop approaches to providing 
high-quality care at low costs. 
ACOs can be thought of as a set 
of providers, including primary 
care physicians, specialists, or 
hospitals, that bear responsibility 
for the cost and quality of care 
delivered to a subset of traditional 
Medicare program beneficiaries.
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ACOs would have to control 
traditional Medicare spending by 
providing financial rewards for 
good performance based on 
comprehensive monitoring of 
quality and spending. Any 
Medicare savings that emerge 
would be shared with the 
providers. Although many details 
of this policy need to be worked 
out, CBO projected that this 
provision would save Medicare 
$4.9 billion. Presumably, some 
payment yet to be determined 
would go to the ACO, and some 
of that would be distributed to 
providers. 
 Two provisions of the law would 
give hospitals a greater incentive 
to promote high-quality care and 
avoid unnecessary readmissions. 
Specifically, starting in 2013, 
Medicare payments will be 
reduced for hospitals with high 
rates of potentially preventable 
readmissions, initially for three 
conditions: acute myocardial 
infarction, heart failure, and 
pneumonia, the three conditions 
with risk-adjusted readmission 
measures currently endorsed by 
the National Quality Forum. The 
hospital's actual readmission rate 
for these conditions will be 
compared to its expected 
readmission rate, and the hospital 
will be subject to a reduction in 
Medicare payment for its “excess 
readmissions.” The CBO 
estimates that this payment 
adjuster would save $7.1 billion 
over 10 years. In addition, the law 
would continue the policy of 
denying Medicare payment for 
treatments associated with 
hospital-acquired conditions and 
extend this policy from Medicare 
to Medicaid. This should 
encourage hospitals to create 
systems that would lower the 
incidence of hospital-acquired 
conditions and, thereby, improve 
quality of care. The CBO 
estimates this would save $1.4 
billion, but that none of this 
would come from Medicaid. 
 
 Several provisions aimed at 
improving efficiency could begin 
building a structure that would 
contain costs in the future, but 
were not scored by the CBO as 
producing savings during the first 
10 years of reform. One such 
provision is related to a national 
pilot program on payment 
bundling in Medicare. Under this 
program, a payment would be 
made for all services provided 
during an episode of care as 
opposed to for individual services. 
The goal would be to promote 
efficiency while maintaining or 
improving quality. Alternative 
approaches could be tested in 
different areas and, if successful, 
could be expanded nationally. The 
law also requires that the 
Secretary of the Department of 
Health and Human Services 
(HHS) develop approaches to 
value-based purchasing that 
provide incentives to hospitals 
and physicians who achieve 
certain preset quality targets. 
Efforts will also be made to start a 
demonstration program to deliver 
primary care services to 
chronically ill Medicare 
beneficiaries in their homes.  
 
 The Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Innovation would run 
several specific initiatives 
described here, and develop and 
test other approaches. Essentially, 
the goal would be to identify the 
encouraging options and extend 
their application. Although this in 
not very specific, the CBO credits 
this entity with achieving $1.3 
billion in savings over 10 years. 
Medicare Payment Cuts 
In addition to providing offsetting 
revenues to fund the coverage 
expansions, the reductions in 
Medicare payments through changes 
in Medicare Advantage rates and 
lower updates to encourage 
productivity improvement could be a 
spur to further cost containment. By 
2019, CMS actuaries project that 
Medicare spending will be more than 
10 percent below previously projected 
levels.
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 Providers could respond to 
these lower payments by making 
substantial changes in the way health 
care services are produced that would 
lower the costs of care. If this 
occurred and private health plans tried 
to piggyback on Medicare policies, it 
could lead to lower prices for health 
care paid through private plans. The 
effect would be to slow health 
expenditure growth. Alternatively, if 
provider responses are limited and the 
history of private health plan 
payments to providers serves as a 
guide, providers with significant 
market power may simply attempt to 
offset the Medicare cuts by seeking 
higher provider prices. This cost-
shifting behavior would limit any 
potential multiplier effects of the 
Medicare payment cuts on overall 
health care spending. If private payers 
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cannot control payments to strong 
providers, it could suggest a need for 
a strong public plan that would 
negotiate prices more aggressively or 
for explicit all-payer rate regulations 
that would determine what private 
plans would pay providers. 
Prevention and Wellness 
Programs 
The health care reform law includes 
several initiatives to reduce future 
spending by preventing disease and 
promoting wellness. Medicare will be 
changed so that an annual wellness 
visit is added to the guaranteed benefit 
package, at a CBO-estimated cost of 
$3.6 billion over 10 years. In addition, 
Medicare would remove copayments 
for preventive care while limiting this 
enhancement in coverage to those 
services for which evidence suggests 
some benefits. These two provisions 
tend to have offsetting effects from a 
cost standpoint, according to the 
CBO. Similar to the Medicare 
provisions, private qualified health 
plans would also have to eliminate 
cost-sharing for recommended 
preventive services. States would 
receive an enhanced federal matching 
payment for Medicaid spending for 
these preventive services and 
immunizations. There are more 
provisions related to prevention and 
wellness. However, although the CBO 
tends to project the costs of these 
programs, they do not assume much 
long-run savings. For example, 
though the costs of services designed 
to prevent the spread of diabetes are 
enumerated, the CBO does not 
attribute any benefits to these 
programs in the form of lower 
spending than would have occurred 
otherwise. Savings could be much 
larger if these programs prove 
effective and private insurers adopt 
them. There is evidence that the CBO 
may have been conservative in 
estimating the potential benefits from 
prevention and wellness programs.
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Reduce Waste, Fraud, and 
Abuse 
Concern over public expenditures for 
services that did not need to be 
provided or were provided 
fraudulently suggests that people 
believe that spending can be 
controlled by ferreting out these 
services. Health reform included new 
resources and penalties to fight fraud 
in the Medicare and Medicaid 
programs. The CBO acknowledges 
that each $1 invested in uncovering 
fraud generates $1.75 in budget 
savings. Across all of the activities, 
the CBO projects that spending would 
fall by $2.9 billion and revenues 
would increase by $0.9 billion over 10 
years. This might be an 
understatement if the incentives for 
waste, fraud, and abuse were changed 
throughout the system, leading to a 
substantial change in provider 
behavior and service patterns. 
Conclusion 
Cost containment is likely to be the 
most difficult challenge facing health 
reform. As opposed to efforts to 
expand coverage, there is much less 
agreement on approaches that can be 
successful in controlling costs. 
Because of this, policymakers are 
trying a wide array of approaches that 
will draw on competition among 
health plans, taxes on high-cost 
insurance plans, delivery system and 
payment reforms, wellness programs, 
and direct controls over Medicare 
provider payments. The law also 
creates a new independent board that 
can directly influence Medicare 
payment policies and make 
recommendations to the private 
sector. Based on the projections by the 
CMS actuaries, there is a reasonable 
expectation that the combination of 
these efforts will allow for a 
significant expansion on coverage 
without an acceleration of cost 
growth. However, we will not know 
for years if the many opportunities for 
cost containment that the health 
reform law created with actually result 
in slower cost growth and avoid the 
need for stronger measures.
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